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Enhancing the Status of Non-State Actors
Through a Global War on Terror?
MARY ELLEN O'CONNELL*
Soon after September 11, President Bush declared a
global war on terrorism and members of terrorist
groups "combatants. " These declarations are not
only generally inconsistent with international law;
they also reverse the trend regarding the legal status
of international non-state actors. For decades, law-
abiding non-state actors, such as international
humanitarian aid organizations, enjoyed ever-
expanding rights on the international plane. Professor
Schachter observed how this trend came at the expense
of the nation-state. He also predicted, however, that
the nation-state would not fade away any time soon.
And, by the late Twentieth Century, the trend toward
enhanced status was noticeably slowing. During this
same period, international criminal organizations,
such as terrorist groups, made little or no progress
regarding international status. They remained firmly
within national criminal law. That situation ended
when the United States catapulted them to the
international plane, enhancing their status at the
United States' cost.
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INTRODUCTION
The puzzling decision of the Bush Administration to declare a
global war on terror and to label terrorists "enemy combatants" has
quite possibly had an unintended consequence for non-state actors. It
has lifted certain individuals out of the status of criminal and into that
of combatant, the same category that the United States' own troops
have while engaging in armed hostilities. The move to label terrorists
combatants is contrary to strong historic trends. From the earliest
times, governments have struggled to prevent their enemies from
approaching a status of equality. Even governments on the verge of
collapse due to the pressure of a rebel advance have vehemently
denied that the violence inflicted by their enemies was anything but
criminal violence. Governments fear the psychological and legal
advantages to opponents of calling them "combatants" and their
struggle a "war." Yet, the Bush Administration, within days of the
September 11 attacks in the United States, declared a "global war on
terror" and designated terrorists "enemy combatants." This Essay
delineates the traditional standing of non-state actors under
interfiational law; it describes the legal distinctions between two
groups of non-state actors: combatants and terrorists; and it concludes
by warning of the potential negative consequences of the collapsing
of the distinction.
The Essay begins by defining non-state actors and describing
their evolving legal status relative to state actors. This first Part
draws upon Professor Schachter's observations on the decline of the
nation-state and the rise of the non-state actor in the late Twentieth
Century.' This Essay then turns to the decision by the Bush
Administration to declare non-state actor terrorist groups "enemy
combatants" regardless of their participation in actual armed conflict.
The Essay explains how this designation pulls terrorists from a lowly
position within the state criminal system, boosting them to a place
more solidly on the international plane. This boost occurs because
"combatants" are generally defined and regulated directly under
international law, while the status and regulation of terrorists
1. Oscar Schachter, The Decline -of the Nation-States and Its Implications for
International Law, 36 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 7 (1997), also printed in POLITICS, VALUES,
AND FUNCTIONS: INTERNATIONAL LAW IN THE 21ST CENTURY 13 (Jonathan I. Chamey et al.
eds., 1997).
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traditionally has been a matter of national criminal law. The Essay's
final Part considers the potential consequences of enhancing terrorist
status in this way and suggests some possible antidotes. It is a dark
irony that the most powerful nation-state of all has put the legal
category of "state" under pressure through the decision to declare war
on terrorism. The final Part again draws on Professor Schachter's
observations on the resilience of the nation-state even in the face of
powerful pressures toward its decline.
I. THE EVOLUTION OF NON-STATE ACTORS UNDER
INTERNATIONAL LAW
These days, when we hear "non-state actor," we tend to think
"terrorist organization." As a technical matter, however, non-state
actors can be any actor on the international plane other than a
sovereign state. Conveniently, most sovereign states are identifiable
by their membership in the United Nations. Non-state actors,
therefore, are those actors on the international plane that are not
members of the United Nations. Inter-governmental organizations,2
non-governmental organizations (NGOs), and individuals-natural
and juridical--can all be classified as non-state actors. We will focus
here on those international non-state actors that consist of groups of
human beings rather than groups of sovereign states. The law-abiding
non-state actors such as Amnesty International, Greenpeace, Doctors
Without Borders, CARE, and Human Rights Watch are typically
designated "NGOs."3  Across the legal divide we find organized
2. "Intergovernmental organization" may be defined as "an association of States
established by and based upon a treaty, which pursues common aims and which has its own
special organs to fulfill particular functions within the organization...." Rudolf L.
Bindschedler, International Organizations, General Aspects, in 2 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW 1289-90 (Rudolf Bernhardt ed., 1992).
3. According to Steve Charnovitz, the term "NGO" originated with the United Nations
Charter. Steve Charnovitz, Two Centuries of Participation: NGOs and International
Governance, 18 MIcH. J. INT'L L. 183, 186 (1997). Article 71 of the U.N. Charter states:
'The Economic and Social Council may make suitable arrangements for consultation with
non-governmental organizations which are concerned with matters within its competence."
"NGOs are private organizations not established by a government or by intergovernmental
agreement which are capable of playing a role in international affairs by virtue of their
activities." ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 612 (1997). The NGO also has
been defined as "[a] private international organization that serves as a mechanism for
cooperation among private national groups in international affairs ...." INTERNATIONAL
LAW DICTIONARY 77 (Robert L. Bledsoe & Boleslaw A. Boczek eds., 1987). The
International Committee of the Red Cross defines them as "organizations, both national and
international, which are constituted separate from the government of the country in which
they are founded." The Code of Conduct for the International Red Cross and Red Crescent
Movement and NGOs in Disaster Relief, at http://www.ifrc.org/publicat/conduct (last visited
2005]
COLUMBIA JOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW
crime and terrorist groups such as the Mafia, the Colombian drug
cartel, the Irish Republican Army, Hamas, Abu Sayyef, and Al-
Qaeda.
NGOs traditionally have had the legal status of individuals,
and consequently, like most individuals, they generally exist under
national law-the law of the place where they are created as well as
the law of the places where they are active. Little, if any, case law
exists describing the parameters of this status. The International
Court of Justice (ICJ) decided in Barcelona Traction that corporations
have the nationality of the place of incorporation.4 By analogy, the
same can be said of those non-state actors that are formed under the
law of a particular state, usually as a non-profit or charitable
organization. Individual members of any type of non-state actor
group enjoy basic human rights wherever they are.5 NGOs as
organizations may, like corporations, claim treatment by a foreign
government at the "minimal international standard." Among other
things, NGO property may not be nationalized without compensation.
Like corporations, NGOs must comply with both the law of the state
of nationality as well as the law of the state where they are active.
Still, NGOs, through the 1990s, gained greater rights and duties
directly from international law. NGOs, supported by some
governments, steadily pressed for greater rights of access-to state
territory and to law-making fora. A certain amount of progress was
made.6 This progress, however, was often thought to be at the cost of
the nation-state's own status on the international plane.
By contrast, international criminal groups remained almost
entirely subject to national criminal law. During the Nuremberg
trials, the Nazi SS and other organizations were declared criminal
Nov. 24, 2004) [hereinafter The Code of Conduct].
4. Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Company, Limited (Belg. v. Spain), 1970
I.C.J. 42-43 (Feb. 5).
5. INTERNATIONAL LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 375 (Louis Henkin et. al. eds., 3d ed.
1993) (stating that:
Customary international law and international agreements have created
obligations of states in favor of natural and juridical persons. The customary
law of state responsibility, under which a state may be responsible to another
state for certain injuries to aliens, is an important example ....
Under the traditional law of state responsibility, as seen in the Mavrommatis
Case... , certain injuries to foreign nationals were considered to be offenses
against the state of which they were nationals. Once the injured alien exhausts
available remedies under the legal system of the state causing the injury, the
state of which the injured party is a national may seek reparation in a state-to-
state claim.).
6. See infra text accompanying notes 10-21.
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entities under international law.7  But apparently no one was
prosecuted for mere membership in these organizations. A variety of
treaties today mandate that governments prohibit, through national
criminal law, the existence of such groups and/or the right of such
groups to carry out certain specified acts.8 Some limited principles of
international law, therefore, are relevant. For the most part, however,
non-state actors, especially criminal groups, are regulated under
national law and have only limited status or "personality" on the
international plane.
Nevertheless, commentators have also suggested that the pre-
eminence of the state is challenged by criminal organizations.
Professor Schachter identified the impact on the state of "uncivil"
society or criminal organizations:
Criminal activity, of course, has always challenged
state authority, but from the standpoint of international
law a new dimension has been added. States and the
international community are now threatened by
transnational crime on an unprecedented scale. Some
of the... causes of globalization as well as the new
communication networks have also increased the
power of lawless groups. The scale of illegal drug
traffic dwarfs the gross national product of many states
and appears to be beyond the effective control of
individual states or even the world community as a
whole. The illegal arms trade also flourishes
ostensibly beyond state control. International money
laundering has expanded into a huge business.
Terrorist activities, while mainly political in aim, also
belong in the category of international criminal
activity. All of these activities dramatically underscore
7. See Charter of the International Military Tribunal ("Nuremberg Charter"), annexed
to Agreement for the Prosecution and Punishment of the Major War Criminals of the
European Axis, Aug. 8, 1945, arts. 8-9, 58 Stat. 1544, 82 U.N.T.S. 279, 284, reprinted in 1
INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL, TRIAL OF THE MAJOR WAR CRIMINALS 8-9 (1947); but
see United States v. Altstoetter (The Justice Case), reprinted in 3 TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS
BEFORE THE NUREMBERG MILITARY TRIBUNALS UNDER CONTROL COUNCIL LAW No. 10, 954
(1946-1953); United States v. Ohlendorf (The Einsatzgruppen Case), reprinted in 4 TRIALS
OF WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE NUREMBERG MILITARY TRIBUNALS UNDER CONTROL
COUNCIL LAW No. 10, 411 (1946-1953).
8. Relative to terrorism, see UNITED NATIONS, INTERNATIONAL INSTRUMENTS RELATED
TO THE PREVENTION AND SUPPRESSION OF INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM (2001). See also
Christopher Greenwood, War, Terrorism and International Law, 56 CURRENT LEGAL PROBS.
505, 507 n.7 (2003). Relative to organized crime, see United Nations Convention Against
Transnational Organized Crime, G.A. Res. 55/25, U.N. GAOR, 55th Sess., Annex 1, Agenda
Item 105, at 30, U.N. Doc. A/RES/55/25 (2000).
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the weakness of nation-states and of the international
legal system.9
Since 1990, however, counter-trends are evident respecting
the prominence of non-state actors and their challenge to the state.
The next section looks particularly at developments respecting the
premier NGOs-the international humanitarian assistance
organizations. These organizations arguably have made the most
progress toward enhanced status, owing to their enjoyment of
international legal rights ensured in treaties and to their willingness to
accept international legal duties that accompany those rights. We
review some of those rights and duties below but also some cases
indicating a slowed pace toward greater international personality for
NGOs. On the other hand, for groups at the opposite end of the non-
state actor spectrum-international criminal organizations that use
violence to achieve their goals-the United States has reversed its
long-held position that terrorists and other criminal organizations
receive no legal recognition as international actors.
A. Aid NGOs'°
Of all non-state actors, Aid NGOs have arguably made the
most progress toward enhanced international status. A variety of
treaties include provisions that accord special status to certain NGOs.
The Geneva Conventions, for example, refer to "impartial
humanitarian organizations," which shall be allowed to supply
foodstuffs, medical supplies, and clothing." States many not object to
the presence of such groups if the civilian population in a zone of
occupation is in need. This suggests that organizations meeting the
criteria of "impartial" and "humanitarian" have certain rights granted
to them directly under international law. Failing to allow NGO access
in such circumstances is a breach of the Geneva Conventions. 2
9. Schachter, supra note 1, at 14-15.
10. Adapted from Mary Ellen O'Connell, Humanitarian Assistance in Non-
International Armed Conflict, The Fourth Wave ofRights, Duties and Remedies, 31 ISR. Y.B.
HUM. RTS. 183 (2002).
11. Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War,
Aug. 12, 1949, art. 59, 6 U.S.T. 3516,75 U.N.T.S. 287.
12. The Conventions also allow for organizations to be designated "Protecting Powers,"
which gives the organizations considerable status-including the right to intervene on behalf
of persons in detention. See, e.g., id. art. 143. Another treaty according NGOs rights directly
includes the European Convention on Human Rights, which permits NGOs to make claims
that their rights under the treaty have been violated. Likewise, the Inter-American and
African Conventions on Human Rights allow NGOs to make claims for individuals who have
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Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions Relating to
the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts of 8 June
1977 requires that states allow the free access of all relief
consignments, equipment, and personnel, even if such assistance is
destined for the civilian population of the adverse party.'
3
Considering this particular provision, the ICJ stated in the 1986
Nicaragua case that "there can be no doubt that the provision of
strictly humanitarian aid to persons or forces in another country,
whatever their political affiliations or objectives, cannot be regarded
as unlawful intervention, or as in any other way contrary to
international law."' 4
NGOs have pressed for the right of access to all populations in
need-not just those caught in international armed conflict. The fact
that more aid is increasingly distributed by NGOs than by
governments makes for a strong argument that aid organizations must
now be accorded certain rights, including the right of access to
sovereign territory, regardless of the state's consent. 5 "Sovereign
rights should no longer be an excuse to refuse humanitarian assistance
or authorized humanitarian intervention."' 6 NGOs have been seeking
the right to enter state territory without specific permission.
7 In
September 1999, the Security Council underlined in Resolution 1265,
"the importance of safe and unhindered access of humanitarian
personnel to civilians in armed conflict, including refugees and
internally displaced persons, and the protection of assistance to
them.. .", and emphasized "the need for combatants to ensure the
safety, security and freedom of movement of United Nations and
associated personnel, as well as personnel of international
humanitarian organizations. . . ." The case could be made that rights
suffered human rights abuse. See MARK E. VILLIGER, HANDBUCH DER EUROPISCHEN
MENSCHENRECHTSKONVENTIONEN (2d. ed. 1998).
13. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions on 12 August 1949, and Relating to
the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), June 8, 1977, art. 70,
1125 U.N.T.S. 3, 16 .L.M. 1391.
14. Military and Paramilitary Activities (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14, para. 242 (June
27) [hereinafter Nicaragua].
15. See NGOs: Sins of the Secular Missionaries, ECONOMIST, Jan. 29, 2000, at 25,
available at 2000 WL 8140551.
16. Jovica Patmogic, Humanitarian Assistance-Humanitarian Intervention, in
INTERNATIONAL LEGAL ISSUES ARISING UNDER THE UNITED NATIONS DECADE OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW 1013, 1023 (Najeeb Al-Nauimi & Richard Meese eds., 1995); see
generally European Commission, 2 LAW IN HUMANITARIAN CRISES, ACCESS TO VICTIMS:
RIGHT TO INTERVENE OR RIGHT TO RECEIVE HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE? (1995).
17. See Rohan J. Hardcastle & Adrian T. Chua, Humanitarian Assistance: Towards a
Right ofAccess to Victims, 325 INT'L REV. RED CROSS 589 (1989).
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and duties are developing for NGOs directly under international law.
This would mean that beyond the right of access, NGOs could make
claims and could be held accountable in international or national
courts when states fail to observe their rights or when the NGO does
not fulfill its duties, duties such as the obligation to do no harm, to
remain impartial in conflicts, to remain neutral, and to accept
accountability. 8
Of these duties, Aid NGOs have pressed for a modified view
of neutrality, one that would allow them to report on human rights
violations or other violations of international law and to play a role in
mitigating violence. 9  Such activities are inconsistent with the
traditional concept of neutrality. Aid organizations have also sought
to refine the "no harm" principle, seeking ways to deliver aid without
exacerbating a conflict. For example, aid groups face the problem of
deciding whether to negotiate agreements with rebel groups for access
to needy populations. Rebel groups have been known to dishonor
agreements intentionally to create new occasions to negotiate. These
groups believe that negotiating with international aid organizations
enhances their status.
The enforcement of NGO rights and duties is the subject of
on-going debate. Christa Rottensteiner reasons that impeding relief
even in non-international armed conflict now constitutes a war
crime,2 i.e., a crime under international law that could be enforced in
various national and international courts. In 1999, UN Secretary
General Kofi Annan called on the Security Council to enforce access
rights. He said the Council should "actively engage the parties to
each conflict in a dialogue aimed at sustaining safe access for
humanitarian operation, and to demonstrate its willingness to act
where such access is denied."' l
18. See The Code of Conduct, supra note 3.
19. See Thomas Weiss, Principles, Politics and Humanitarian Action, 13 ETHICS &
INT'L AFFAIRS I (Carnegie Council on Ethics and International Affairs ed., 1999). For voices
defending traditional, strict neutrality, see Joelle Tanguy & Fiona Terry, Humanitarian
Responsibility and Committed Action, 13 ETHICS & INT'L AFFAIRS 29, 29-35 (Carnegie
Council on Ethics and International Affairs ed., 1999). See also Report of the Secretary
General, U.N. GAOR 55th Sess., Agenda Item 10, Prevention of Armed Conflict, at 25, U.N.
Doc. A/55/985-S/2001/574 (1999).
20. Christa Rottensteiner, The Denial of Humanitarian Assistance as a Crime Under
International Law, 81 REv. INT'L CROIX ROUGE 555, 568-69 (1999). Despite the exclusion
of this crime from the International Criminal Court's jurisdiction, Rottensteiner believes that
using starvation as a weapon is a war crime in non-international armed conflict and that
impeding relief is a form of using starvation as a weapon, ergo impeding relief is a war
crime.
21. Report of the Secretary General, supra note 19, Annex I, at 16.
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More recent events, however, suggest retrenchment.
Humanitarian organization personnel have been detained in Russia
and Afghanistan and expelled from Sudan. The United Nations has
not authorized a use of force to enforce humanitarian principles in the
absence of a ceasefire since the Haiti mandate in 1994. These and
other events indicate that the expansion of rights and duties relative to
humanitarian assistance may not continue as in the first decade after
the Cold War. A few cases are reviewed below suggesting that recent
practice is in opposition to the trend toward the enhanced status of
NGOs. These cases indicate that NGOs have had greater difficulty
gaining access if non-neutral. They have had difficulty developing a
no harm principle. The cases suggest aid groups do not have greater
discretion regarding the principle of neutrality. Rather, such groups
remain largely under the law of the place where they are working, in
distinction to international law.
One case indicating retrenchment concerns Afghanistan. On
December 19, 2000, the Security Council voted to increase sanctions
against Afghanistan and approved Resolution 1333, which imposed
financial, travel, and trade sanctions on the country in support of
conventions to eliminate illegal drugs, to secure humanitarian law and
human rights, and to suppress terrorism.22 An Afghan official stated
after the vote that the "sanctions... will aggravate the problems of
the common Afghan people because almost 70 percent of the Afghan
population have been grappling with malnutrition and hunger as a
result of the drought situation in the country and UNSC previously
imposed sanctions."'23 Many aid workers left the country when the
new sanctions were imposed.24 Shelter Now, a group based in
Germany, remained in Afghanistan but had six foreign workers and
over twenty local workers arrested in August 2001, apparently on
charges of preaching Christianity. The Taliban rulers of Afghanistan
alleged they had confiscated Bibles and other religious material from
Shelter Now's offices?2
The international reaction to the arrest, as well as Shelter
22. UN Security Council Resolution 1333 strengthens sanctions already imposed in
Resolution 1267. Compare S.C. Res. 1333, U.N. SCOR, 55th Sess., 4251st mtg., U.N. Doc.
S/RES/1333 (2000) with S.C. Res. 1267, U.N. SCOR, 54th Sess., 4051st mtg., U.N. Doc.
S/RES/1267 (1999).
23. National: Afghan Govt. Pulls Out of Talks with Opposition, Protests Sanctions,
PAK. PRESS INT'L INFO. SERV. LTD., Dec. 20, 2000, at 2000 WL 30047543; Off-Target
Sanctions, BOSTON GLOBE, Dec. 26, 2000, at A22, available at 2000 WL 3356913.
24. The Taliban Dilemma: More Sanctions Against the Taliban?: They Will Also Hurt
Afghanistan's Starving, ECONOMIST, Dec. 16, 2000, at 44, available at 2000 WL 8144844.
25. O'Connell, supra note 10, at 214-15.
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Now's reaction, was to deny that the group preached Christianity and
to demand consular access. This reaction implies that the group had
the right to be in Afghanistan and to distribute aid, but recognized no
right to be anything but strictly neutral in doing so. Thus, the group
had no right to preach.26
A second case publicized in 2000 involved the Canadian
branch of a prominent international aid organization. CARE (the
Cooperative for Assistance and Relief Everywhere) had contracted
with the Canadian government to recruit human rights monitors for
the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE).
The OSCE planned to use the monitors to ensure compliance with the
October 1998 cease-fire agreement that Richard Holbrooke had
negotiated with Yugoslavia with regard to Kosovo in October 1998.27
CARE's lead representative in Kosovo was arrested by Yugoslavia
and charged with spying. The question was whether CARE violated
the obligation of strict neutrality. One media account held: "The
latest disclosures come amid growing international concern about the
apparent readiness and willingness of the CARE aid agency to
compromise its independent humanitarian role in war-torn countries
such as Somalia and Bosnia.
28
In 2004, in the crisis in Darfur, Sudan, the government
ordered the local directors of the prominent international aid agencies,
Oxfam and Save the Children, to leave the country. The NGOs
protested, as did the United Nations. None of the protests questioned
Sudan's right to exclude aid workers. Rather, the protests indicated
Sudan's government has full discretion regarding whom it allows in
its country.
29
No state or organization today argues that NGOs operate on
the international plane on anything like the same footing as states or
even inter-governmental organizations. In contrast to the 1990s, there
are few indications that the premier non-state actors, impartial
international humanitarian aid organizations, have significantly raised
their status on the international plane since the start of the new
century.
26. Id.
27. CARE "Spies" Cast Shadow on Aid Agency's Work, TORONTO STAR, Feb. 15, 2000,
available at 2000 WL 126850595; see also Sue Neales & Andre Clennel, CARE Aided U.S.
Agents in Somalia, SYDNEY MORNING HERALD, Feb. 9, 2000, available at 2000 WL 2310651.
28. Id.
29. Somini Sengupta, Sudan Orders Out Leaders of Two Groups Aiding Darfur, INT'L
HERALD TRIB., Nov. 30, 2004, at 2, available at 2004 WL 90971334.
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B. Terrorist Groups°
Before September 11, 2001, terrorist organizations remained
largely the subject of national criminal law. A variety of treaties and
resolutions of the United Nations Security Council and General
Assembly have mandated that states take action to suppress terrorism,
but these obligations have been directed at states.3 Even when
terrorist groups have used significant and sustained armed violence,
their acts were treated as criminal unless a state was found to be
legally responsible for the actions of the group.32 In those cases
where a state was responsible, a significant act of violence could be
treated as an armed attack, giving rise to the right of self-defense by
the victim state under Article 51 of the United Nations Charter.
33
Where no link to state responsibility exists, terrorist and other
criminal non-state actors remain, as a matter of law, at the sub-state
level rather than at the inter-state level. For criminal groups' acts of
violence to rise to the level of direct concern for international law, the
view has been that the non-state actor must be connected with a state
or be in a position to challenge a state authority by controlling
significant territory.34 The acts of groups lacking these links to a state
or territorial control are usually viewed as acts of criminal violence,
not acts of war. More recently, the creation of the International
Criminal Court (ICC) and the formation of a body of crimes for which
individuals and groups can be held accountable directly under
international law have enhanced the status of non-state actors under
international law. Yet, as explained below, the ICC statute reinforces
the traditional view that for a group's actions to be considered war or
armed conflict there must be a connection to a state.
The categorization of terrorism as a criminal act and not a
war-like act has held true since the first attempts to regulate terrorism
at the international level. The 1937 League of Nations Convention on
30. Adapted from Mary Ellen O'Connell, Ad Hoc War, in KRISENSICHERUNG UND
HUMANITARER SCHUTZ-CRISIS MANAGEMENT AND HUMANITARIAN PRoTEcTION 405 (Horst
Fischer et al. eds., 2004).
31. See, e.g., S.C. Res. 1368, U.N. SCOR, 56th Sess., 4370th mtg., U.N. Doc.
S/RES/1368 (2001); S.C. Res. 1373, U.N. SCOR, 55th Sess., 4385th mtg., U.N. Doc.
S/RES/1373 (2001).
32. O'Connell, supra note 30, at 413-14.
33. "Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or
collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs against a member of the United Nations,
until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain international peace and
security."
34. Armed groups that control significant territory in an armed conflict have
traditionally been designated "belligerents."
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the Prevention and Punishment of Terrorism addressed states directly
and contained a broad definition of terrorism. It never entered into
force, attracting only one ratification.35 Since then, no general treaty
against terrorism has developed, but various conventions have
required states to make specific acts a violation of national criminal
law, such as airplane hijackings, bombings, and hostage-taking.36
Consensus for a general treaty foundered over the issue of whether
national liberation movements, regardless of the methods they used,
should be exempted from the definition of terrorist organization. The
United States and other Western states opposed such an exemption.
For Schachter, too, it was the act, not the cause, that mattered. For
him, terrorism "has a core meaning that virtually all definitions
recognize. It refers to the threat or use of violence in order to create
extreme fear and anxiety in a target group so as to coerce them to
meet political (or quasi-political) objectives of the perpetrators."37 It
is not the terrorist's objective that determines his status, but the
methods used. Terrorists generally operate as organized groups not
under state control; they are non-state actors.3" When they operate
with the support of or under the control of a state, the legal situation
shifts and the groups are then usually referred to as state-sponsored
terrorists.
The United States has consistently opposed exempting any
group from criminal liability for terrorist acts based on the nature of
their causes. In addition to the area of anti-terrorism treaties, the
United States firmly opposed exempting national liberation
movements that used terrorist methods from the UN General
Assembly's Definition of Aggression and other resolutions.39 The
35. Greenwood, supra note 8, at 506.
36. Id. at 506-07 (citing Rosalyn Higgins, The General International Law of Terrorism,
in TERRORISM AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 13, 14-19 (Rosalyn Higgins & Maurice Flory eds.,
1997)).
37. OSCAR SCHACHTER, INTERNATIONAL LAW IN THEORY AND PRACTICE 162-63 (1994).
38. Id. at 163.
39. G.A. Res. 3314, U.N. GAOR, 29th Sess., Supp. No. 31, U.N. Doc. A/9631 (1974):
Article 3 provides:
Any of the following acts, regardless of a declaration of war, shall,
subject to and in accordance with the provisions of article 2, qualify as an
act of aggression:
(a) the invasion or attack by armed forces of a State of the territory of
another State, or any military occupation, however temporary, resulting
from such invasion or attack, or any annexation by the use of force of the
territory of another State or part thereof,
(b) Bombardment of the armed forces of a State against the territory of
another State or the use of any weapons by a State against the territory of
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United States refused to become a party to the 1977 Additional
Protocol I to the 1949 Geneva Conventions chiefly because national
liberation movements were elevated to the status of states for
purposes of designating an armed conflict "international" rather than
"internal" and according to liberation fighters the status of
combatants. President Reagan asserted forcefully that designating
groups based on cause rather than objective factual indicators would
encourage terrorism:
One of [Protocol I's] provisions.., would
automatically treat as an international conflict any so-
called "war of national liberation." Whether such wars
are international or non-international should turn
exclusively on objective reality, not on one's view of
the moral qualities of each conflict. To rest on such
subjective distinctions based on a war's alleged
purposes would politicize humanitarian law .-. . It
would give special status to "wars of national
liberation," an ill-defined concept expressed in vague,
subjective, politicized terminology. Another provision
another State;
(c) The blockade of the ports or coasts of a State by the armed forces of
another State;
(d) An attack by the armed forces of a State on the land, sea or air forces,
or marine and air fleets of another State;
(e) The use of forces of one State which are within the territory of
another State with the agreement of the receiving State, in contravention
of the conditions provided for in the agreement of any extension of their
presence in such territory beyond the termination of the agreement;
(f) The action of a State in allowing its territory, which it has placed at
the disposal of another State, to be used by that other State for
perpetrating an act of aggression against a third State;
(g) The sending by or on behalf of a State of armed bands, groups,
irregulars or mercenaries, which carry out acts of armed force against
another State of such gravity as to amount to the acts listed above, or its
substantial involvement therein.
Article 7 provides:
Nothing in this Definition, and in particular article 3, could in any way
prejudice the right to self-determination, freedom and independence, as
derived from the Charter, of peoples forcibly deprived of that right and
referred to in the Declaration on Principles of International Law
concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation among States in
accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, particularly peoples
under colonial and racist regimes or other forms of alien domination: nor
the right of these peoples to struggle to that end and to seek and receive
support, in accordance with the principles of the Charter and in
conformity with the above-mentioned Declaration.
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would grant combatant status to irregular forces even if
they do not satisfy the traditional requirements ....
This would endanger civilians among whom terrorists
and other irregulars attempt to conceal themselves.40
The United Kingdom did ratify Additional Protocol I, but only
with the following understanding when it did so: "It is the
understanding of the United Kingdom that the term 'armed conflict'
of itself and in its context denotes a situation of a kind which is not
constituted by the commission of ordinary crimes including acts of
terrorism whether concerted or in isolation."'"
The traditional U.S. position, like that of the United Kingdom,
is that a group using terrorist tactics should be equated with states
only when sponsored by a state or in control of territory. Otherwise,
as the excerpt above from President Reagan's letter clarifies, the
United States would not grant combatant status to irregular fighters,
especially not to terrorists. Professor Schachter observed in 1995 that"no State has considered itself to be legally at war in response to
terrorism .... 42
The exception to this traditional position occurred where a
state was legally responsible for terrorist acts. If a state were
involved, terror attacks could possibly trigger the right of another
state to respond in self-defense against the responsible state and thus
initiate an armed conflict. This is also possible where terrorists
establish a de facto state by controlling territory within a former
unitary state. Whether terrorist acts are the responsibility of the state
is a question answered by the law of state responsibility.43 Today, a
40. President's Message to the Senate Transmitting a Protocol to the 1949 Geneva
Conventions, I PuB. PAPERS 1987-88 (Jan. 29, 1987), reprinted in 81 AM. J. INT'L L. 910,
911 (1987); but see Hans Peter Gasser, An Appeal for Ratification by the United States, 81
AM. J. INT'L L. 912 (1987). Reagan includes the following examples of requirements to
qualify as a combatant: the need "to distinguish [oneself] from the civilian population and
otherwise comply with the laws of war." These are, however, the requirements to qualify for
prisoner-of-war status, not combatancy. A combatant is one who participates directly in
armed conflict. Thus, the key to understanding who is a combatant is knowing what an
armed conflict is and what direct participation is. See infra text accompanying notes 56-57.
41. Marco Sass6li, Use and Abuse of the Laws of War in the "War on Terrorism," 22
LAW & INEQ. 195 (2004) (citing Reservation by the United Kingdom to art. 1, para. 4 & art.
96, para. 3 of Protocol I, available at http://
www.icrc.org/ihl.nsf/e29be9b3462f48b8c12563110050c790/Oa9eO3ff2ee757ccl256402
003fb6d2?Open Document).
42. SCHACHTER, supra note 37, at 169.
43. The most up-to-date statement of this law is found in the International Law
Commission's Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts,
in Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of Its Fifty-third Session, U.N.
GAOR, 56th Sess., Supp. (No. 10) at 43, U.N. Doc. A/56/10 (2001), available at
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state will be responsible if it sends persons to carry out an attack,44
adopts the acts of the group after the fact, or develops sufficiently
close links with a terrorist group.
The ICJ found in the Nicaragua case that acts of the Contra
rebels fighting in Nicaragua were not attributable to the United States
because the United States did not exercise "effective control" over the
rebels.4 ' The ICJ also found in the Hostages case that a state might be
responsible if it adopts the acts of the attackers as its own.
46 More
recently, the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former
Yugoslavia (ICTY) has developed a new test of attribution--one with
a significantly lower threshold than "effective control." In Prosecutor
v. Tadic, the ICTY said:
The control required by international law may be
deemed to exist when a State (or, in the context of an
armed conflict, the Party to the conflict) has a role in
organising, coordinating or planning the military
actions of the military group, in addition to financing,
training and equipping or providing operational
support to that group.47
The Tadic judgment sought to distinguish the test in
Nicaragua. However, both Tadic and Nicaragua were dealing with
the question of when the acts of individuals or groups could be
attributed to a state. The ICTY plainly established an alternative
attribution standard to that in Nicaragua, despite its claims to the
contrary.48 Moreover, the international community appeared to accept
http://www.un.orglaw/ilc/texts/State_-responsibility/responsibilityfra.htm (last visited Jan.
15, 2005) [hereinafter Responsibility of States]. The articles are also annexed to G.A. Res.
56/83, U.N. GAOR, 56th Sess., U.N. Doe. A/RES/56/83 (2001).
44. See G.A. Res. 3314 (XXIX), U.N. GAOR, 29th Sess., Supp. No. 19, at 143, Annex,
art. 3 (1974) ("Definition of Aggression") (defining aggression as:
Any of the following acts, regardless of a declaration of war, shall. . . qualify as
an act of aggression: ... (g) The sending by or on behalf of a State of armed
bands, groups, irregulars or mercenaries, which carry out acts of armed force
against another State of such gravity as to amount to the acts listed above, or its
substantial involvement therein.).
45. Nicaragua, 1986 I.C.J. at 54-55.
46. In the Hostages case, the ICJ found Iran was responsible for the hostage-taking at
the U.S. Embassy because of the "failure on the part of the Iranian authorities to oppose the
armed attack by militants" and "the almost immediate endorsement by those authorities of
the situation thus created." United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran (U.S.
v. Iran), 1980 I.C.J. 3, para. 9 (June 27) [hereinafter Hostages case].
47. Prosecutor v. Tadic, Judgment, No. IT-94-1-A, para. 137 (July 15, 1999), available
at http://www.un.org/icty/tadic/appeal/judgement/tad-aj
9 90 7 15e.pdf (July 15, 1999).
48. Greenwood, supra note 8, at 521.
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that the Taliban, Afghanistan's de facto government in 2001, was
responsible for actions of the terrorist group Al-Qaeda. Yet, the
evidence did not support the argument that the Taliban "effectively
controlled" AI-Qaeda. At best there was coordination, joint financing
efforts, and the provision of safe haven.49 Thus, the Tadic test appears
to be the prevailing one.
Under the Tadic test, if a state is responsible for terrorist
attacks amounting to an armed attack on the territory of another state,
the state attacked may respond in self-defense against the territory of
the responsible state." The rule is less clear in the case of failed
states, but the better argument appears to be that if a state is wholly
unable to control the acts of terrorists on its territory, a state suffering
attacks originating in such a failed state may also use force in self-
defense. In all other cases, measures less than force in self-defense
are required. Because the habitable landmass of the entire world is
basically divided into state territory, any state wishing to use armed
force in self-defense against a terrorist organization not on its own
soil must first assess the responsibility of the state against whose
territory the force will be used.
The above analysis is the legal position long maintained by the
United States. The United States used force against Libya in 1986
because its agents were perpetrating terrorist attacks and the United
States had clear and convincing evidence these attacks would
continue.5 The United States supported Israel's military operations
against Lebanon in the 1980s and Turkey's incursions into Northern
Iraq in the 1990s because in both cases the states in question were
wholly unable to control the on-going attacks of terrorists on their
territory. Israel's use of force against Tunisia in the 1980s did not
follow the U.S. legal position, and the United States was critical of
Israel for using force against a state that was not responsible for the
PLO's terrorist acts and was not a failed state. 2
In the ICJ's 2004 advisory opinion as to the legal
consequences of Israel constructing a security barrier or wall on
occupied Palestinian territory, Israel cited Security Council
49. Mary Ellen O'Connell, Re-leashing the Dogs of War, 97 AM. J. INT'L L. 446, 451-
52 (2003) (reviewing CHRISTINE GRAY, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE USE OF FORCE (2000)).
50. See generally, Mary Ellen O'Connell, Lawful Self-Defense to Terrorism, 63 U.
PITT. L. REV. 889 (2002); Mary Ellen O'Connell, Evidence of Terror, 7 J. CONFLICT & SEC.
L. 19 (2002).
51. O'Connell, Evidence of Terror, supra note 50, at 25-26. In some cases, consent of
the territorial state will also allow a victim state to use force in self-defense.
52. Candice Hughes, Security Council Condemns Wazir Slaying, U.S. Abstains,
ASSOCIATED PRESS, Apr. 25, 1988, at 1988 WL 3779956.
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resolutions made following September 11 that acknowledge the right
of a state to act in self-defense against terrorist attacks per UN Charter
Article 5 1. Israel argued that if a state may use armed force in self-
defense against terrorists, non-forcible measures, such as a security
barrier, were a fortiori lawful. The ICJ replied to this argument that
"Article 51 of the Charter... recognizes the existence of an inherent
right of self-defence in the case of armed attack by one State against
another State. However, Israel does not claim that the attacks against
it are imputable to a foreign State."53 Thus under Article 51 Israel had
no right of self-defense that could be cited as justification for
constructing the wall or barrier.
Rather, the situation Israel faced at the time of the Advisory
Opinion was more akin to terrorist attacks perpetrated by the state's
own nationals within the state's own territory because of the measure
of control Israel exercises over the occupied territories. Terrorist
attacks by nationals within their own state have invariably been
treated as criminal. The British and Spanish have long resisted the
IRA and ETA being labeled anything but terrorist groups.54 Only
when terrorists have organized themselves into armed groups with a
chance of challenging a government in effective control will a state
admit that civil war is occurring on its territory. In other words, only
when terrorists have reached a status of belligerency or de facto
statehood, or are sponsored by a foreign state, is Article 51 relevant.
This is arguably the situation for Russia with respect to
Chechnya, yet even there the Russian government resists calling the
violence civil war rather than terrorism.55 Russia does not want to
admit that it has lost control of its territory to the degree that
organized armed groups are able to engage Russia's own military in
an armed conflict. Russia prefers to call these opponents terrorists,
rather than combatants.
Combatants are those who take direct part in armed conflict.
Thus, the key elements of the status are the existence of an armed
conflict and direct participation. Armed conflict involves fighting at a
certain degree of intensity, among organized armed groups fighting
within or between states.56 Direct participation means more than
53. Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian
Territory, 2004 I.C.J. 131 (July 9).
54. See generally HILAIRE McCOUBREY & NIGEL D. WHITE, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND
ARMED CONFLICT 318 (1992).
55. That was the case until September 2004. See Dmitry Zaks, Putin's Chechnya War,
Five Years and Still Counting, AGENCE FR.-PRESSE, Oct. 1, 2004, at 2004 WL 9493944.
56. See Leila Nadya Sadat, Terrorism and the Rule of Law, 3 WASH. U. GLOBAL STUD.
L. REv. 135, 140 (2004).
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association with a group that may be participating directly; it means
actually fighting in the armed conflict or providing close support to
those who are fighting.57 Those far from the zone of hostilities are not
combatants.
The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court further
supports the traditional position. Although the Statute includes some
provisions that would make terrorist acts criminal directly under
international law, the statute makes clear that no act is a war crime
unless it occurs during an armed conflict.5
In sum, international law continues to reflect that non-state
actors are largely regulated under national law. Even international
humanitarian aid organizations with at least some limited rights
provided directly under international law have not made great strides
in recent years to build on those rights. Terrorist groups-the
antithesis of humanitarian aid organizations-also remain largely
regulated under national law. Acts of terror are not equated with acts
of war. While acts of war are regulated directly under international
law, terrorism and terrorists remain subject to national law.
II. GLOBAL WAR AND ENEMY COMBATANTS
Despite the requirement of a state connection for terrorists to
be considered part of an armed conflict and to be considered
combatants, following the attacks of September 11, 2001, the Bush
Administration declared the United States to be involved in a global
war on terrorism;59 it declared terrorists to be "enemy combatants;"6
and it declared the war on terror would "not end until every terrorist
group of global reach has been found, stopped and defeated."6 This
57. Michael Schmitt, "Direct Participation in Hostilities" and 21st Century Armed
Conflict, in KRISENSICHERUNG UND HUMANITARER SCHUTZ-CRIsIS MANAGEMENT AND
HUMANITARIAN PROTECTION 505 (Horst Fischer et al. eds., 2004).
58. See Michael Bothe, War Crimes, in THE ROME STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL
CRIMINAL COURT: A COMMENTARY 379, 388 (Antonio Cassese et al. eds., 2002).
59. See President's Address to the Nation on the Terrorist Attacks, 37 WEEKLY COMp.
PRES. Doc. 1301 (Sept. 11, 2001); President's Address to a Joint Session of Congress on the
United States Response to the Terrorist Attacks of September 11, 37 WEEKLY COMP. PRES.
Doc. 1432 (Sept. 20, 2001); Training Camps and Taliban Military Installations in
Afghanistan, 37 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 1432 (Oct. 7, 2001); President's Address Before
a Joint Session of the Congress on the State of the Union, 39 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 109
(Jan. 28, 2003), all available at www.whitehouse.gov.
60. Memorandum from William J. Haynes, II, General Counsel of the Department of
Defense, Enemy Combatants, at http://www.cfr.org/publication.php?id=5312.
61. President's Address to a Joint Session of Congress on the United States Response to
the Terrorist Attacks of September 11, 37 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 1432 (Sept. 20, 2001).
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Part reviews the Administration's arguments in support of its
declaration of global war,62 its designation of terrorists as combatants,
and its reversal of the United States' long-held position.
The Administration says that the September 11 attacks were
an act of war committed by Al-Qaeda, and thus the United States is at
war wherever Al-Qaeda exists. National Security Adviser
Condoleezza Rice explained the global war on terror is a "new kind of
war" to be fought on "different battlefields."63 The Deputy General
Counsel for International Affairs at the Department of Defense,
Charles Allen, has explained that in a global war on terror the United
States can target "Al Qaeda and other international terrorists around
the world and those who support such terrorists without warning. ,64
He emphasized that the existence of the "war" depends on the person
targeted, not the existence of armed hostilities. Thus, Allen suggests
the United States has the legal right to target and kill an AI-Qaeda
suspect on the streets of Hamburg, Germany, or any other peaceful
place. 5
The Administration has produced few arguments to defend its
declaration of global war and its conferral of combatant status on
terrorists. Rather than defend its decision to declare terrorists to be
combatants, the Administration has devoted more legal argumentation
to explaining why members of terrorist organizations are "unlawful"
combatants. This is plainly an easier argument to make than
explaining how individuals who were never in combat can be
combatants in the first place. The General Counsel of the Department
of Defense, William J. Haynes, II, has explained, "The President has
determined that al Qaida members are unlawful combatants because
(among other reasons) they are members of a non-state actor terrorist
group that does not receive the protections of the Third Geneva
Convention."66 It is true that a non-state actor terrorist group does not
62. President's Address Before a Joint Session of Congress on the State of the Union,
39 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 109 (Jan. 28, 2003), available at
www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/01/20030128-19.htm.
63. Fox News Sunday (Fox News television broadcast, Nov. 10, 2002), at 2002 WL
7898884.
64. Anthony Dworkin, Official Examines Legal Aspects of Terror War, at
http://hsm.intellibridge.com/summary?viewid=1 17201800 (on file with author). See also
Doyle McManus, A U.S. License to Kill, A New Policy Permits the C.LA. to Assassinate
Terrorists, and Officials Say a Yemen Hit Went Perfectly. Others Worry About the Next
Time, L.A. TIMEs, Jan. 11,2003, at Al1.
65. Anthony Dworkin, Law and the Campaign Against Terrorism: The View from the
Pentagon, Crimes of War Project, at http://www.crimesofwar.org/print/onnews/pentagon-
print.html (Dec. 16, 2002).
66. Memorandum from William J. Haynes, II, supra note 60.
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receive the protections of the Geneva Convention. The reason it does
not is because the group is a non-state actor and not a group of
combatants. Pointing out that Al-Qaeda is not covered by the Third
Geneva Convention only helps to confirm that, generally, Al-Qaeda
members are not combatants. It adds nothing to support Haynes's
argument that Al-Qaeda members are combatants, unlawful or
otherwise.
According to Ruth Wedgwood, treating Al-Qaeda terrorists as
combatants is justifiable because "Al Qaeda has declared jihad
against the United States, and in fatwa after fatwa, Osama bin laden
has announced that all Americans are valid targets."'67 She ignores the
fact that, since the adoption of the United Nations Charter,
declarations of war no longer have legal significance.68 What matters,
as President Reagan pointed out in the excerpt above,6 9 is the actual
fact of armed conflict. Wedgwood's focus, however, is not so much
on trying to prove that the war on terror is a real war with real
combatants, but rather on arguing that the application of national
criminal law is cumbersome. She makes it clear that the Bush war on
terror is about making it easy to kill, detain, and interrogate people,
not about a defensible case of war or combatancy under international
law.
70
It is true that during armed conflict, the U.S. armed forces may
target enemy combatants without warning and may detain enemy
combatants who are captured until the end of hostilities without trial.7'
"The purpose of captivity is to exclude enemy soldiers from further
military operations. Since soldiers are permitted to participate in
lawful military operations, prisoners of war shall only be considered
as captives detained for reasons of security, not as criminals. '72
67. Ruth Wedgwood, Combatants or Criminals? How Washington Should Handle
Terrorists, FOREIGN AFF., May-June 2004, at 127, available at
http://www.foreignaffairs.org/20040501faresponse83312/ruth-wedgwood-kenneth-
roth/combatants-or-criminals-how-washington-should-handle-terrorists.html.
68. See Mary Ellen O'Connell, What is War? JURIST, Mar. 17, 2004, at
http://www.jurist.law.pitt.edu/forum/oconnelll.php (Mar. 17, 2004).
69. President's Message to the Senate Transmitting a Protocol to the 1949 Geneva
Conventions, I PUB. PAPERS 1987-88 (Jan. 29, 1987), reprinted in 81 AM. J. INT'L L. 910,
911 (1987).
70. Wedgwood, supra note 67.
71. Geneva Convention [No. III] Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, Aug.
12, 1949, art. 118, 75 U.N.T.S. 135 [hereinafter Prisoners' Convention]; cf Protocol
Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of
Victims of International Armed Conflicts, June 8, 1977, art. 75(3), 1125 U.N.T.S. 3
[hereinafter AP I]. At the end of active hostilities, however, prisoners must be released.
Prisoners' Convention, supra, art. 118.
72. Horst Fischer, Protection of Prisoners of War, in The HANDBOOK OF
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Detainees may, however, in proceedings consistent with minimum
due process, be tried for law violations committed prior to capture.
73
Arguably the detaining power has a duty to try persons for grave
breaches of humanitarian law.74 Combatants who have not violated
humanitarian law, however, may not be tried for acts of war. In the
absence of an armed conflict, international human rights law prohibits
arbitrary detention.75 If authorities wish to detain someone because he
or she is a criminal suspect, the person must be informed of the
charges and receive a fair, public, and prompt trial.7 6 Suspects may
not be detained indefinitely.
The Administration argues that any person suspected of
association with terrorists may, as an enemy combatant, be detained
in military prisons without access to defense counsel until the end of
the war on terror. As of September 2004, President Bush had
declared two people arrested in the United States to be "enemy
combatants." Ali Saleh Kahlah al-Marri, a Qatari citizen, studying in
Peoria, Illinois, was first placed in civilian custody as a material
witness. Late in 2001, he was charged with lying to the FBI and with
credit card fraud.77  He then was declared an enemy combatant on
June 23, 2003, and was moved from a prison in Illinois to a military
brig in South Carolina.78 Jos6 Padilla was arrested on May 8, 2002, in
Chicago.79  He was originally arrested by civilian authorities and
charged with various terrorism crimes, and then he, too, was moved
from civilian to military custody after President Bush declared him an
enemy combatant. The President said Padilla qualified as a
combatant for, inter alia, "conduct in preparation for acts of
international terrorism.""0
Neither al-Maari nor Padilla was detained in a zone of armed
conflict. They are, therefore, not combatants, but the Bush
Administration has created its own definition of "combatant." It
HUMANITARIAN LAW IN ARMED CONFLICT 326 (Dieter Fleck ed., 1995).
73. Prisoners' Convention, supra note 71, arts. 84, 105; AP I, supra note 71, art. 75.
74. Prisoners' Convention, supra note 71, arts. 129-30.
75. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 19, 1966, art. 9, para. I,
999 U.N.T.S. 171,175.
76. Id. arts. 9(2), 14(1), 14(3)(a), 14(3)(c).
77. Eric Lichtblau, Bush Declares Student an Enemy Combatant, N.Y. TIMES, June 24,
2003, at Al5.
78. Id.
79. Newman exrel. Padilla v. Bush, 233 F. Supp. 2d 564, 571, 573 (S.D.N.Y. 2002).
80. Presidential Order Designating Jose Padilla an Enemy Combatant (June 9, 2002), at
http://www.cnss.org/padillapresord.pdf (Aug. 27, 2002).
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asserts anyone associated with terrorism is a combatant. This
assertion means, according to Marco Sass6li, that we now have the
"absurd result, [of] permitting targeted assassinations in the midst of
peaceful cities .... ." For Sass6li this possibility proves that "all those
suspected to be 'terrorists' cannot be classified as combatants."'"
In addition to its weak arguments regarding the definition of
combatant, the Administration has also failed to explain the impact of
the global war declaration on the U.S. military. If the war is
everywhere, members of the U.S. armed services are lawful targets
anywhere. Yet, most Americans surely make the common sense
assumption that U.S. service members away from an active theater of
combatant are not lawful targets for killing or detention. The
common sense position tracks the law.
III. CONSEQUENCES
Individuals have lost basic rights as a result of the Bush
Administration's erroneous legal claims. Those are not, however, the
only negative consequences of the Bush Administration's position.
Past U.S. administrations had good reasons for standing against
equating terrorists with combatants. The Bush Administration's post-
September 11 position stands in stark contrast. Rather than striving to
find war where it does not exist, governments typically refuse to
acknowledge the existence of war when it does exist. Rather than
extending the privileges of humanitarian law to armed groups, 2
governments prefer to characterize fighting on their territory as
lawlessness or criminality. They prefer to apply national criminal law
to their enemies and even to their armed forces when fighting enemies
within the state. The motivation for this preference is the perception
that calling opponents "combatants" and declaring the struggle
against them "war" elevates their status above that of mere
81. Sass6li, supra note 41, at 213 (citing LAWYERS COMMITrEE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS,
ASSESSING THE NEw NORMAL: LIBERTY AND SECURITY FOR THE POST-SEPTEMBER 11 UNITED
STATES 53, 71 (2003)). See also the position the Administration took in federal court that an
elderly Swiss lady who sends money to a charitable organization could also be a combatant if
the money ends up with Al-Qaeda. Neil A. Lewis, Searching for Limits on Power to Detain,
INT'L HERALD TRIB., Dec. 3, 2004, at 4.
82. Humanitarian law "comprises the whole of established law serving the protection of
man in armed conflict." Christopher Greenwood, Scope of Application of Humanitarian
Law, in The HANDBOOK OF HUMANITARIAN LAW IN ARMED CONFLICT, supra note 72, at 39.
Humanitarian law is referred to more commonly in the United States as "law of armed
conflict." It is the law governing the conduct of warfare--the jus in bello. It is found in
conventions such as the 1907 Hague Convention, the 1949 Geneva Conventions, and the
1977 Protocols to the Geneva Conventions, as well as in customary international law.
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criminals.13 There is a reason that members of the IRA used hunger
strikes to try to pressure the British government into recognizing them
as prisoners of war. According to Greenwood, however,
In the language of international law there is no basis
for speaking of a war on Al-Qaeda or any other
terrorist group, for such a group cannot be a
belligerent, it is merely a band of criminals, and to
treat it as anything else risks distorting the law while
giving that group a status which to some implies a
degree of legitimacy.'
The United States' traditional position better protects the
United States. Terrorism, in all its forms, must be de-legitimized. It
must be disassociated from any lawful objective, such as the right of
self-determination or freedom from military occupation. The United
States would have been far better served if it had declared "global law
enforcement" instead of "global war" after September 11. A far
better approach would have been fostering healthy states through the
principle of non-intervention, the prohibition on force, respect for
proportionality in the use of coercion, and promotion of human rights.
Schachter emphasized the continuing importance of the territorial
state. Even NGOs serving the public good, while they:
have a growing role in the political and legal processes
of contemporary society,... [they are] only partial,
serving some interests, some groups. They do not
ensure what the territorial state promises-an arena in
which all in the defined territory have access to
common institutions and the equal protection of law."5
Supporting states over non-state actors would have left the
United States in a far better position to demand that states be
responsible for the activities on their territory and to prevent
terrorism.86 Instead, the United States has encouraged Russia to
declare a global war on terror, as well, with the equal right to target
and detain any person it designates an enemy combatant, anywhere.
The terrorists have now moved up a rung in the hierarchy of actors
under international law. They can now better challenge the state. The
Bush Administration apparently failed to study past U.S. legal
83. See Greenwood, supra note 8, at 528-29.
84. Id. at 529.
85. Schachter, supra note 1, at 22; see also, Gregory H. Fox, Strengthening the State, 7
IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 35 (1999).
86. See generally Sadat, supra note 56.
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positions regarding terrorism. Whether for that reason or some other,
they have failed to understand how their strategy of global war has
enhanced the status of terrorist non-state actors.
